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On Class-Not-Race 
Samuel R. Bagenstos 
Throughout the civil rights era; strong voices have argued that policy 
interventions should focus on class or socioeconomic status, not race. 
At times, this position-taking has seemed merely tactical, opportunistic, 
or in bad faith. Many who have opposed race-based civil rights inter-
ventions on this basis have not turned around to support robust efforts 
to reduce class-based or socioeconomic inequality. That sort of oppor-
tunism is interesting and important for understanding policy debates in 
civil rights, but it is not my focus here. I am more interested here in 
the people who clearly mean it. For example, President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson-who can hardly be accused of failing to support robust race-
based or class-based interventions-advised Dr. Martin Luther King 
after Congress passed the Voting Rights Act that the race-neutral, class-
based Great Society programs had to be counted on to eliminate race 
inequality from that point forward.1 William julius Wilson famously 
argued that our policies should focus on "the truly disadvantaged" of all 
races and spelled out a rather aggressive approach to promoting eco-
nomic development in American cities.2 And Richard Kahlenberg and 
Richard Sander have urged that universities should get rid of race-based 
affirmative action in admissions but replace that policy with preferences 
for members of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups.3 
Calls for class-not-race interventions are likely to grow stronger over 
the next few years. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Fisher v. Uni-
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versity ofTexas atAustin4-which did not formally change the law govern-
ing affirmat..ive action in higher education admissions but did highlight 
the vulnerability of the policy with the current Supreme Court-has 
been read by some commentators as auguring a decisive turn toward 
class-based affirmative action.5 The Supreme Court's decision uphold-
ing Michigan's state constitutional prohibition on race-based affirmative 
action in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action6 predictably 
led to renewed calls for class-based preferences? This, then, seems an 
opportune time to examine the class-not-race position that underlies 
them. 
There is a lot that can be said about the beyond-race interventions 
favored by class-not-race advocates. And I say a lot of it elsewhere.8 
Here, I want to focus on a single aspect of the argument. I want to 
develop an understanding of whaL sincere advocates of the class-not-
race position mean and offer an initial assessment of whether that posi-
tion is a sensible one. 
It seems to me that sincere advocates of the class-not-race position are 
making one of two distinct arguments. The first argument is basically 
a strategic one. That argument accepts that racial inequality is a funda-
mental problem that we must attack. It argues, however, that for a vari-
ety of pragmatic reasons, race-targeted approaches are not likely to be 
the most successful ways of attacking them. There is much to this argu-
ment, but it seems to suffer a basic flaw. Problems of race inequality go 
well beyond problems of economic or class inequality. And there is a lot 
of reason to believe that efforts to respond to class inequality that do not 
take race into account either will not help or actually will exacerbate race 
inequality. I discuss those points in Part I below. 
These points lead to the second distinct argument that advocates of 
the class-not-race position may be making. That argument is that race 
inequality is not in fact the fundamental problem that we should attack 
but is at best an example or a consequence of class or economic inequal-
ity. If we have a limited reservoir of enforcement resources, redistrib-
utive largesse, or public compassion, the argument implies, we should 
focus that reservoir on eliminating class-based inequality. I think some 
argument like this explains why many people influenced by traditional 
left politics support the class-not-race position. But I nonetheless believe 
that the argument is wrongheaded. The problem of racial inequality 
overlaps with, but is importantly distinct from, economic disadvantage. 
I discuss these points in Part II. 
In Part III, I assess the prospects for getting beyond the class-not-race 
position. Although I find some reasons for hope on this score, I am, ulti-
mately, pessimistic. 
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I. The Strategic Argument for Class-Not-Race 
Many of the reasons offered for the class-not-race position are essen-
tially strategic. These arguments assert not that class-not-race is superior 
as a matter of principle or first-best policy but that approaches that tar-
get class instead of race are more likely to succeed in the political or 
legal process than are approaches that focus directly on race. This is 
most apparent in the context of affirmative action. Many of the advo-
cates of class-based affirmative action-particularly after the Supreme 
Court decisions making race-based affirmative action more difficult to 
defend-believe that targeting class rather than race will place the prac-
tice of affirmative action on stronger legal ground. The legal-doctrinal 
argument is certainly a key talking point for some of the most promi-
nent advocates of class-based affirmative action.9 
Viewed purely as a tactical gambit to shore up the legality of affir-
mative action, it is unclear whether a focus on class instead of race will 
work. Under current doctrine, it is a nice question whether admissions 
preferences for people of particular socioeconomic statuses are consti-
tutional when they are motivated by a desire to achieve a particular 
racial outcome. The argument that they are unconstitutional involves 
a seemingly straightforward application of Washington v. Davis10 and its 
progeny (which held that race-neutral practices that are motivated by 
race are the equivalent of racial classifications) and Adarand Construc-
tors v. Pena11 and its progeny (which held that the constitutionality of 
racial classifications is the same no matter which race is benefited or bur-
dened). We know that if a school adopted a class-based preference for 
applicants from higher socioeconomic classes and did so with an aim of 
increasing the proportion of whites that are admitted, that action would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Given Adarand's holding that equal 
protection analysis does not depend on which race is burdened or bene-
fited, shouldn't the result be the same when a school adopts a preference 
for applicants of lower socioeconomic classes, with an aim of increasing 
the proportion of minorities who are admitted?12 
But the Court has never been called on to add up the Davis and 
Adarand lines of cases in this precise way. And there are substantial rea-
sons to think that it will balk before ruling race-motivated bu t class-
based affirmative action unconstitutional.13 One is that in its cases inval-
idating affirmative action programs, the Court has looked carefully to 
ensure that race-neutral means could not achieve the same ends.14 
Although that analysis does not logically compel the conclusion that 
race-neutral affirmative action programs are constitutional, a contrary 
conclusion would stand in great tension with it. Moreover, Justice 
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Kennedy's pivotal concurrence in the Parents InvoLved case15 suggests that 
he would vote to uphold class-based affirmative action programs. In that 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy explained his decision to provide the fifth 
vote to invalidate race-based student assignment plans in K-12 schools. 
He indicated that race-neutral efforts to achieve diversity and overcome 
racial isolation would be constitutional-and indeed probably would not 
even be subject to strict scrutiny.16 As a pure predictive matter, then, it 
seems unlikely that five justices on this Supreme Court would invalidate 
class-based affirmative action. 
Other strategic arguments for the class-not-race position are political 
rather than legal in nature. William Julius Wilson emphasizes many of 
these points in THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED.17 Policies that aim overtly at 
protecting or advancing the interests of particular disadvantaged racial 
groups may be especially politically vulnerable. This may be because of 
implicit or overt racial bias in the political process, including the phe-
nomenon of selective sympathy and indifference.18 It may be because 
of a general support for color-blindness among the public and political 
leaders-a sense that race should not matter. (Query how much overlap 
there is between these two positions.) Or il may be because of simple 
majoritarianism. Policies that obviously provide benefits to a minority 
of the population may be politically vulnerable to efforts by the majority 
to get some of those benefits for itself. 
As Wilson makes explicit, these arguments tie rather directly to argu-
ments among social policy experts regarding targeted versus universal 
social-welfare policies.19 Many experts argue that social-welfare policies 
are more politically durable when they are framed in universal terms.20 
Means-tested programs like welfare (or, perhaps now, food stamps) are 
understood to be more vulnerable than universal social insurance pro-
grams like Social Security. There are a couple of reasons for this. One, 
again, is simple majoritarianism-if everyone feels they can benefit 
from a program, it will be easier to persuade them to support it than 
if they are paying for the benefit of someone else. Another is a sense 
of desert. Universal programs are more easily understood in solidaristic 
terms as a reciprocal covenant among all citizens. As a result, solidaristic 
and reciprocal principles of distribution make sense-one deserves to 
receive benefits because one is a citizen and has contributed to the sys-
tem.21 But the public expects one to prove desert for targeted benefits 
more specifically-if an individual is receiving government benefits to 
which other individuals are not entitled, the public expects the benefi-
ciaries to demonstrate that they really deserve them. As a result, targeted 
programs are administered in a much more stingy fashion than univer-
sal ones. And scandals regarding alleged waste, fraud, and abuse arise 
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far more easily in targeted programs and are far more likely to delegit-
imize those programs than they are to delegitimize universal programs 
of social insurance. 
This is a very controversial issue in the social policy world. Professors 
Schuck and Zeckhauser make a strong theoretical argument that tar-
geted programs more efficiently achieve their aims and therefore are 
more likely to draw political support than are less efficient universalist 
ones.22 Basic public choice theory also suggests that targeted programs 
will generate fervent support from their beneficiaries, while the broad 
spreading of the costs will dampen opposition from those who do not 
receive the benefits.23 (This point seems more plausible when the ben-
eficiaries are not as socially and politically disempowered as the bene-
ficiaries of race-based interventions, however.) And the empirical evi-
dence on targeting versus universalism is mixed. Social Security is, to 
be sure, far more politically stable than was welfare. But when we look 
at smaller programs for classes of poor people, the targeted ones (that 
focus on people with disabilities or children in poverty) have, on occa-
sion, seemed more resilient than the broader universalist ones.24 
In the race-versus-class context as well, the strategic argument for 
universalism is not obviously correct. For one thing, class-based inter-
ventions (like class-based affirmative action) may readily come to be 
understood in the public mind as really targeted toward minorities.25 
That is particularly true because in many cases, the alternative to race-
based interventions is not universal social insurance; it is a policy that 
really is targeted at disadvantaged people, just a bit more broadly than 
at minorities. Think about welfare in this regard and the general axiom 
that programs for the poor are poor programs. One reason programs for 
the poor are politically vulnerable is that they are often associated in the 
public mind with racial minorities. Efforts to target class-based disad-
vantage as a way of eliminating racial disadvantage often are understood 
as being "really" about race and provoke political resistance accord-
ingly-a point George Romney, U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development from 1968 to 1973, learned when his efforts to achieve 
economic integrati.on in housing provoked fierce resistance from white 
suburbanites who feared that racial integration would be the result.26 
William julius Wilson's critique of the Great Society is apt here. Wilson 
argued that the Great Society's reliance on means-tested antipoverty 
programs associated it with minorities and made it politically vulner-
able.27 Unless efforts to focus on class rather than race take the form 
Wilson's effort does-by employing truly broad-scale economic devel-
opment programs- they will likely remain politically vulnerable as tar-
geted programs. And the truly universal proposals urged by Wilson and 
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others have virtually no hope of being achieved in our current politi-
cal environment, in which austerity sets the terms of economic policy 
debates. 
Class-based policies, then, may not be especially politically strong. 
And there may be circumstances in which programs targeted at racial 
minorities are quite strong politically-precisely because they appeal to 
a shared commitment to equal opportunity. To the extent that race-
focused programs are understood as overcoming the particular injustice 
of discrimination or the legacy of slavery and segregation, many people 
will see that disadvantage as not being the fault of the beneficiaries 
(unlike poverty in general). In those circumstances, candid use of race 
will be politically superior to the use of class as a proxy for race. 
I do not doubt, however, that class-focused approaches are likely to be 
more defensible, legally and politically, than race-focused ones in many 
cases. But this brings us to the deeper problem with the strategic argu-
ments for class-not-race. Recall that the premise of the strategic argu-
ment is that race-based injustice is a distinct and important concern that 
the law should address; the argument for class-not-race is that class is 
a more legally and politically stable way to address that concern than 
is targeting racial injustice directly. But that argument depends on class 
disadvantage being a good proxy for race disadvantage. And it is not. In 
other words, even if class is a more stable way of addressing the prob-
lem, it does not address the problem very well. In part, that is because 
there are so many more poor white people than poor minorities that any 
help to poor people in general dilutes what minorities get (assuming a 
sort of constant budget of compassion). But there is a more fundamental 
reason class disadvantage is not a good proxy for race disadvantage. The 
strategic argument assumes that racial disadvantage is a subset, a specific 
application, of class disadvantage-or at least that there is a large overlap 
between the two categories. There is certainly some overlap, but racial 
disadvantage is in fact quite distinct. Racial disadvantage in the United 
States involves economic deprivation, to be sure, but it also involves 
stigma and stereotypes with a variety of consequences for the day-to-
day lives of even economically advantaged members of racial minority 
groups.28 
And efforts to focus on class disadvantage may actually reinforce the 
structures that promote racial disadvantage. We know this, in part, from 
history. The New Deal took what was well understood as a class-not-
race approach. It led to substantial economic development. But because 
of the lines of eligibility its programs drew-lines that were formally 
race-neutral- it also entrenched racial hierarchy and subordination.29 
As insightful recent work by Jessica Clarke and KT Albiston argues, 
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these problems are not confined to history.30 They argue that formally 
gender-neutral efforts to expand women's opportunities in the work-
place, like the Family and Medical Leave Act, have actually entrenched 
gender hierarchy in workplaces. Deborah Malamud makes the same 
point about class-based affirmative action.31 
I do not mean to deny that class-based approaches might be a possible 
second-best solution to the problem of racial disadvantage. Legal and 
political developments may substantially limit the prospect of relying 
on race-based approaches, so class-based ones might be the best avail-
able way of achieving those ends. But the same legal, and especially 
political, developments are likely to limit the utility of class-based 
approaches in achieving racial justice. If the class-not-race position is a 
purely strategic one, it is a deeply problematic one. 
II. The Substantive Argument for Class-Not-Race 
I have argued that class-based interventions are not likely to be an espe-
cially effective way of overcoming race-based disadvantage. But what if 
race-based disadvantage is not what we think of as the essential prob-
lem? What if the basic problem is class-based disadvantage? While race-
and class-based disadvantage overlapped in the past, one might argue, 
there is a substantial disconnect between the two problems now, and it is 
class, not race, on which our policy interventions should focus. I call this 
the substantive argument for class-not-race. This argument is implicit 
or explicit in many critiques of race-based affirmative action. Numer-
ous affirmative action critics ask why the child of the Huxtables, or of 
a rich African immigrant family, should get a preference over a poor 
white kid from Appalachia. William Julius Wilson asks why we should 
have policies that benefit the most advantaged blacks but do very little 
for the least advantaged blacks-those whom he called "the truly disad-
vantaged.'' The argument is basically that racial disadvantage may have 
at some point overlapped with class disadvantage but that the two have 
diverged. Now that they have diverged, we should identify which of 
these is the real problem. And, the advocates of class-not-race argue, the 
real problem is class. The influence of traditional left-wing thinking on 
this position is patent. 
There is obviously something to this argument. In a nation in which 
economic inequality continues to grow, and our public services shrink, 
life chances and opportunities depend greatly on the socioeconomic cir-
cumstances in which one is born.32 And this is true for people of all 
races. Policy interventions that focus on ameliorating economic inequal-
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ity and class disadvantage are important tools to attack this serious prob-
lem. 
But I think the substantive class-not-race argument ultimately reflects 
a category mistake in treating race-based policies as ultimately ain1ed 
at alleviating economic inequalities. Antidiscrimination law and affir-
mative action have of course provided economic advancement to some 
women and minority group members. And that is a significant goal 
of these bodies of law. Scholars tend to agree, in particular, that the 
first decade of enforcement of Title VII was associated with a dramatic 
increase in the earnings of Mrican Americans relative to those of 
whites.33 
But why must we choose which is the reaL problem? Both economic 
inequality and racial disadvantage are, it seems to me, real problems. We 
can acknowledge that members of disadvantaged socioeconomic classes 
face common barriers to opportunity, whatever their race. And, as 1 have 
argued, there are more poor whites than there are poor blacks and Lati-
nos (though a much higher proportion of the black or Latino population 
than of the white population is poor). The problems of poor people of all 
races are best addressed by race-neutral programs of economic devel-
opment and public assistance. 
But race remains an important axis of disadvantage in America, even 
of its own accord. Some of this disadvantage is economic. Even middle-
and upper-middle-class blacks are more likely to hold that status pre-
cariously than whites. They have less wealth on average, they are more 
likely to have relatives in poverty, and they are more likely to have chil-
dren who are downwardly mobile economically.34 
Some of this disadvantage relates directly to continuing discrimina-
tion. Housing discrimination keeps African Americans segregated in 
less desirable neighborhoods, which limits educational opportunities.35 
Employment discrimination continues to limitjob opportunities.36 Dis-
crimination extends beyond economic opportunities: use of race by law 
enforcement drives home the salience of race in the day-to-day lives 
of members of racial minority groups, for example.37 And racial bias 
in the criminal justice system has a pervasive effect on minority com-
munities.38 In a provocative recent paper, Betsey Stevenson and Justin 
Wolfers argue that "the fruits of the civil rights movement may lie" 
beyond economic opportunities but "in other, more difficult to docu-
ment, improvements in the quality of life-improvements that have led 
to rising levels of happiness and life satisfaction for some blacks."39 As 
they note, however, "these improvements have taken decades to be real-
ized, and even if current rates of progress persist, it will take several 
more decades to fully close the black-white happiness gap."40 
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Much of this continuing race-based disadvantage results from subtle, 
unconscious, or implicit racial bias.41 But the disadvantage also results 
from the persistence of racial stereotypes. These stereotypes and biases 
make it necessary for minority group members in many jobs to engage 
in constant impression management to demonstrate that they do not 
conform to the stereotypes. This impression management imposes a 
significant personal cost. But it also can be self-defeating, by discourag-
ing the sort of risk-taking that leads to success in many employment set-
tings.42 (There is obviously a similar double-bind in the case of women 
in workplaces.) Even the most economically advantaged African Amer-
icans face these constraints, as the example of the fine line President 
Obama has had to walk in managing racialized expectations demon-
strates.43 
These problems are distinct from the problems of socioeconomic 
class. And we know that ameliorating economic inequality and disad-
vantage will not necessarily eliminate these problems of racial inequal-
ity. Rather, the most effective way we know to ameliorate problems of 
racial discrimination is an affirmative focus on promoting racial inte-
gration throughout society. Intergroup contact and work on common 
projects on terms of equality remain the best ways to break down stereo-
types and bias.44 Although there are substantial legal and political bar-
riers to achieving that goal-something I have lamented in my earlier 
work45-policies that specifically target racial discrimination and 
inequality are the first-best way to respond to those problems. To say 
that our policy should focus on class instead of race is to say that we 
should not address these problems. And I can think of no good substan-
tive, as opposed to strategic, argument for doing that. 
Ill. Class-and-Race: The Civil Rights Act and the Great Society 
I should emphasize that to be against class-not-race is not to favor the 
opposite policy-race-not-class. We live in a big, complex world, one 
with many axes of disadvantage. I do not know of any advocate for 
racial justice who is against ameliorating class-based injustice. Nobody 
seriously proposes including racial diversity as a factor in a higher-
education admissions policy but refusing to consider class or economic 
disadvantage. Advocates of expanded antidiscrimination law typically 
strongly support antipoverty laws and broad-based economic develop-
ment policies. Consider, in this regard, how race-oriented civil rights 
laws, antipoverty policies, and broad-based social insurance were all cru-
cial pieces of the Great Society. There may be tactical questions about 
how and when to press different pieces of the agenda, but there is no 
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reason we must choose to ameliorate disadvantages along only class or 
only race axes. 
Indeed, I would argue that the most effective social justice strategies 
are those that, like the Great Society, combine efforts to eliminate the 
effects of group-targeted discrimination with broader efforts to promote 
social welfare. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 guaranteed nondiscrimina-
tion in employment, which helped African Americans gain access to job 
opportunities that had previously been closed to them. But the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act, Head Start, and other Great Society 
Programs provided educational opportunities that made it more likely 
that more African Americans could take advantage of those new job 
opportunities. In my earlier work, I have argued that the Americans 
with Disabilities Act's effects on employment for people with disabilities 
have been significantly limited by the failure to pursue social welfare 
interventions (like universal health insurance and investment in accessi-
ble transportation) that would break down deep-rooted structural barri-
ers to employment.46 And women's workplace opportunities have been 
limited by both narrow interpretations of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and the failure to provide child care and paid family leave; an effec-
tive solution to this problem would combine more robust antidiscrimi-
nation protections with more robust social provision.47 To make further 
progress against racial inequality will require both an aggressive effort to 
enforce antidiscrimination provisions and a broader focus on economic 
development and providing housing and educational opportunities.48 
So why do we have this endless fight? One reason I assumed away at 
the outset- bad faith. What about people who sincerely support class-
oriented, but not race-oriented, interventions? The essential reason, I 
think, is strategic, but in a broader sense than I discussed in Part I. For 
many years, one of the only commitments that united both edges of the 
progressive movement-those influenced by social democratic politics 
at the left edge and mainstream centrists at the right edge-was the con-
viction that identity politics was bad for the movement. Each faction had 
a slightly different reason for, or way of articulating, its position: those 
on the Left believed that identity politics undermined class solidarity 
among the working class, while the centrists believed that identity poli-
tics made it difficult to appeal to "mainstream" Americans. But however 
derived, the policy agenda of both the leftists and the centrists eschewed 
race-oriented solutions in favor of class-oriented ones. 
There is some reason to believe that political conditions now have 
evolved in a way that might make it possible for each of these factions 
newly to endorse race-focused interventions. Labor unions have 
achieved great success in recent years by appealing to identity politics 
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and incorporating race- and sex-focused goals into broader class-
focused ones. It appears, then, that identity politics need not undermine 
the class solidarity that those on the left of the progressive spectrum aim 
to achieve. And Barack Obama won two consecutive presidential elec-
tions by assembling a coalition of racial minorities, together with a size-
able minority of whites. So identity politics perhaps need not impede 
mainstream political success. In this environment, race-oriented inter-
ventions may seem less threatening to the success of progressive politics 
in general, and advocates of class-not-race may be persuaded to rethink 
the notion that there must be a choice between race- and class-based 
approaches. 
Yet there are substantial grounds for pessimism on this score. Despite 
the makeup of his electoral coalition, President Obama tended to 
emphasize class-focused remedies at the expense of race-focused 
ones.49 And the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence of antidiscrim-
ination law and affirmative action are likely to make race-focused inter-
ventions less tenable, at least for the near future. Ultimately, then, the 
class-not-race position may be the best we can do, despite its problems. 
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